Face Verification Using 60~GHz 802.11 waveforms by Hof, Eran et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
11
96
5v
2 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  1
 Ju
n 2
02
0
Face Verification Using 60 GHz 802.11 waveforms
Eran Hof
Qualcomm Israel Ltd
P.O. Box 1212
Israel
ehof@qti.qualcomm.com
Amichai Sanderovich
Qualcomm Israel Ltd
P.O. Box 1212
Israel
amichais@qti.qualcomm.com
Evyatar Hemo
Qualcomm Israel Ltd
P.O. Box 1212
Israel
ehemo@qti.qualcomm.com
Abstract—Verification of an identity based on the human face
radar signature in mmwave is studied. The chipset for 802.11
Qualcomm ad/y networking that is cable of operating in a radar
mode is used. A dataset with faces of 200 different persons was
collected for the testing. Our preliminary study shows promising
results for the application of autoencoder for the setup at hand.
Index Terms—Face verification, mmwaves, 802.11 ad/y, radar.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic biometric authentication is becoming increas-
ingly popular as mean of identification in front of ma-
chines [1]. The main advantage of such authentication is,
of course, removing the need for remembering passwords or
pass phrases. This allows a non-expert and occasional user
to securely operate machines with full authentication. Face
verification (see [2],[3] and also [4]) is a recent important
addition to the biometric arsenal techniques. It is non-intrusive,
hands-free, and is acceptable by most users.
Different sensors are used for face recognition. RGB cam-
era, is one of the well known sensors. The main drawback
of the RGB camera is that it suffers from variable lighting
condition. It addition, RGB camera suffers from poor-detection
performance of a mask or photograph (see [1]). In order
to overcome these, RGB-D (D for depth) sensors are used
for facial verification. These sensors include structured light
sensors and time-of-flight sensors (see, e.g., [5],[6],[7]). In
this work, we study the potential of face verification based
only on the radar signature as captured by the Millimeter-wave
(mmWave) networking schipset system that can be operated in
a radar fashion. The chipset used in our study if a fully func-
tional 802.11 Qualcomm1 ad/y networking communication
(see, e.g., [8], [9]). Recent interests in mmWave radars is found
in gesture recognition and related applications, see e.g. [10],
[11], [12] and references therein. Scanners for security appli-
cations based on mmWave technology are adopted in airports
worldwide and ongoing research effort focus on advanced
algorithmic technique for analyzing mmWave signals, see, e.g.,
[13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21].
A 802.11ad/y packet starts with a short training field,
followed by a channel estimation field (CEF), packet header,
physical layer (PHY) payload and optional fields for gain
1Qualcomm 802.11 is a product of Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. and/or
its subsidiaries.
Fig. 1. A Radar system with a target and the corresponding received signal.
control and additional training. A CEF is composed of Golay
complementary sequences (128 symbols long) used in estimat-
ing the channel response characteristics. Complementary Go-
lay sequences are well-studied signals in the radar community
(see, e.g., [22], [23], [24]). Emerging 802.11ad technology and
its PHY suitability for radar applications motivated the study
in providing opportunistic radar devices based on 802.11ad
technology [25], [26], [27]. This is somehow different then
legacy frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radars
(see, e.g., [28], [29]). Our observations for the facial verifica-
tion are the Golay correlation outputs (see [30]) for each of
the transmit/receive antenna element pairs. Golay sequences
enable us to remove non-relevant reflections and focus the
verification processing on returning wave only from the face
surface. To the best of our knowledge, no such dataset is
publicly available.
The rest of this paper continues as follows, in Section II
the radar system and related technology are described, the
capturing process and the dataset building is provided in
Section III, the approach we used for the verification is detailed
in Section IV and Section V concludes the paper.
II. SENSOR DESCRIPTION
An illustration of a radar system is depicted in Fig. 1. An
electromagnetic wave is transmitted from the radar tx module
and reflected back from a target object (a hand in Fig. 1).
Some electromagnetic energy is reflected back to the location
of the receiver which can sample the received signal and detect
the presence of a target. Our sensor, depicted in Fig. 2, is
similar to the radar scheme described in [25], we are re-using
an existing communication system as a 60 GHz radar sensor.
60 GHz is favorable due to the small wavelegth (5mm), the
Fig. 2. A Radar setup based on Qualcomm’s 802.11 ad/ay communication
system. The system includes a 802.11 chip connected to two RF and antenna
modules. The system is highly miniature in size as compared to a 2 euro-cent
coin.
III. FACE CAPTURING USING MMWAVE RADAR
We first describe the capturing of the dataset used in our
study. The head of each subject is placed in front of the radar
sensor, for two bursts, each taking 3 seconds with about 8
seconds in between. During this time, the sensor captured 200
frames per orientation/distance. The signal is recorded in time
corresponding to distances of 30cm and 50cm. In addition,
capturing is repeated for for different orientations: 24,15
degrees left and right, and looking at the center. The capturing
is demonstrated in Fig. 3.The subjects in our study included
both men and women, at variable ages, some were wearing
glasses and some having beards. For each pair of transmit and
receive antenna elements (32 TX × 32 RX antenna element
pairs for the chipset at hand), the Golay correlation outputs
for the distances at hand (and the corresponding depsth, e.g.
24 cm for a human face) are recorded. Unlike camera image,
each of these complex-valued numbers represents the energy
that was reflected from the face. That is, there is no ”empty”
pixels.
IV. FACE VERIFICATION
The studied authentication scheme is based on a two stage
process as detailed in Fig. 4: enrollment of the person where
the training data is captured, and then a verification query that
the registered person is indeed standing in front of the radar
by comparing the captured frame to the training data during
the enrollment stage.
We distinguish between one-class and multi-class classi-
ficaiotn. A multi-class classification is a problem where an
unknown image needs to be classified into a class out of
several possible classes. For example, by classifying apples
and oranges, we can determine if the unknown image is an
image of an apple or an orange. However, if the picture is of
a cat, the multi-class classifier can not tell us this. One-class
Fig. 3. The capturing setup in action
Fig. 4. A two stage biometric verification process
classification on the other hand (see, e.g., [31]), trains only
seeing positive targets, not exposed to any negative samples.
An example for such classification is to train the one-class on
images of apples. Then when it sees a tomato or an orange, it
classifies it as ”not an apple”, as long as the tomato or orange
are significantly distinct from than the apple. Such sn approach
is helpful when we do not have access to a large collection
of representative negative data. This is the case with mmWave
images, where negative captures are harder to get. Additional
advantage of one-class classifier is the ability to enroll into
the system without usage of remote dataset which contains
the negative data.
An autoencoder is a technique to build a one-class classifier
in which the input is encoded into a compressed representation
through an encoder. The compressed representation is then de-
coded back into an output. A good autoencoder is one in which
the input and the output are similar to each other in a minimum
mean square error (MSE) sense. A common implementation
of the encoder and the decoder in the autoencoder is composed
of a feed-forward artificial neural network with the same
input and target output as seen in Fig. 5 [32],[33]. A small
hidden layer in an autencoder network creates an information
bottleneck, forcing the network to compress the data into a
low-dimensional representation. For a simple autoencoder with
a single hidden layer, the vector of the hidden unit activities,
Fig. 5. Deep autoencoder
h, is given by
h = f(We · a + biase) (1)
where f is the activation function (we use the logistic sigmoid
function in this work), We is a parameter matrix, and biase
is a vector of bias parameters. The hidden representation of
the data is then mapped back into the space of a using the
decoding function:
aˆ = f(Wd · h + biasd ) (2)
where Wd is the decoding matrix and biasd a vector of
bias parameters. We learn the parameters of the autoencoder
by performing stochastic gradient descent to minimize the
reconstruction error which is the MSE between a and aˆ (mean
over the dimension of a):
MSE (a, aˆ) = ‖a − aˆ‖
2
2
= ‖a − f (Wd · h + biasd )‖
2
2
. (3)
When the hidden layer has fewer dimensions than a, the
autoencoder learns a compressed representation of the training
data. Non-linear hidden units allow the autoencoder to learn
more complex encoding functions, as do additional hidden
layers.
A. Results
The MSE as a result of one of the faces is shown in Fig. 6
(MSE is over the 6K dimensions of the captured frame). The
MSE quantifies how well the autoencoder encoded the trained
data. We see in this figure that the training data from a specific
person resulted with MSE of 60. When running the test data
(due to the low number of data samples we used only 10% as
test data) we get the same MSE of around 60. When we run
the trained autoencoder over the negative data (other faces),
we got MSE of no less than 250, where 78% of the captured
frames resulted with an MSE of over 1500. This is enough
separation to distinguish between the different faces in the
captured dataset. We next tuned a threshold value on the MSE
to determine the region of convergence (ROC) by running
the trained autoencoders over the entire ensemble of captured
Fig. 6. MSE results for an autoencoder trained on a specific person, as the
ordinate. The abscissa stands for the captured frame index.
Fig. 7. ROC for several tested networks and inputs. The 32 transmit antennas
with 32 receive antennas with one (solid circles) or two (dashed stars) hidden
layers are the two upper curves. 10 transmit and 10 receive antennas are the
two lower curves, where 48 wide layer is clearly insufficient when compared
to 64 neurons.
faces. This is shown in Fig. 7. For the two hidden layers
scheme, we observe excellent results, with false negative of
less than 2%, we get false positive < 10−6. This is indicative
of a strong distinctiveness between the radar signatures of
different faces and the high correlation between samples of
the same person. In Fig. 7 we checked several configurations.
We tested what happens when we reduce the dimensionality of
the radar signature 10 times by taking only 10 antennas out of
the 32. It is seen that such reduction significantly reduces the
distinctiveness between the faces. We also checked what is the
right configuration for the autoencoder network, and noticed
an improvement once we increase the number of neurons in
the hidden layer and when an additional hidden layer was
added.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A dataset of face signatures as captured with a mmWave
radar is introduced. This dataset contains the capturing of
about 200 faces of different people. The faces captured include
two genders and multiple ages. In addition, the set includes
people with and without eyeglasses and beards. One of the key
findings of our research is that the dataset shows distinctive-
ness between the faces of different persons. Moreover, is our
study shows that there is a correlation between different cap-
tures of the same face. In our study we trained a deep autoen-
coders based on neural networks. With those autoencoders,
we demonstrated promising results indicating the potential
of using mmWave signature as an additional modality for
facial verification/recognition. mmWave can penetrate through
fabrics and hair and thus can provide a more robust, reliable
and secure verification. By re-using the commercially available
communication chipset, the solution can be low cost as well.
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